Induction-recursion is a powerful definition method in intuitionistic type theory. It extends (generalized) inductive definitions and allows us to define all standard sets of Martin-Löf type theory as well as a large collection of commonly occurring inductive data structures. It also includes a variety of universes which are constructive analogues of inaccessibles and other large cardinals below the first Mahlo cardinal. In this article we give a new compact formalization of inductive-recursive definitions by modeling them as initial algebras in slice categories. We give generic formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules generalizing the usual rules of type theory. Moreover, we prove that the elimination and equality rules are equivalent to the principle of the existence of initial algebras for certain endofunctors. We also show the equivalence of the current formulation with the formulation of induction-recursion as a reflection principle given in [12] . Finally, we discuss two type-theoretic analogues of Mahlo cardinals in set theory: an external Mahlo universe which is defined by induction-recursion and captured by our formalization, and an internal Mahlo universe, which goes beyond inductionrecursion. We show that the external Mahlo universe, and therefore also the theory of inductive-recursive definitions, have proof-theoretical strength of at least Rathjen's theory KPM.
Introduction
Induction-recursion is a powerful definition method in intuitionistic type theory in the sense of Scott ("Constructive Validity") [31] and Martin-Löf [17, 18, 19] .
The first occurrence of formal induction-recursion is Martin-Löf's definition of a universeà la Tarski [19] , which consists of a set U 0 of codes for small sets together with a decoding function T 0 which maps a code to the small set it denotes. U 0 is inductively generated at the same time as T 0 is defined by recursion on the elements of U 0 , and the introduction rules for U 0 refer to T 0 . It is called universe "à la Tarski" because of the similarity with Tarski's truth definition: U 0 is a generalized syntax of "formulas" and T 0 maps each formula to its "meaning". In earlier formulations of Martin-Löf type theory [17, 18] universes are formulated "à la Russell", where there is no syntactic distinction between an element of U 0 and the set it denotes. Therefore there is no need for a decoding function and hence there is no (explicit) induction-recursion.
Intuitionistic type theory with inductive-recursive definitions is also a suitable metalanguage for intuitionistic metamathematics. For example, in Martin-Löf's proof of normalization of an early version of his type theory [20] he introduces Taitstyle computability predicates for dependent types. Whereas Tait defines a family of computability predicates indexed by the types of the simply typed lambda calculus, Martin-Löf's computability predicates are indexed by those types which themselves are computable. This gives rise to a situation where the computable types are inductively generated at the same time as the computability predicate on terms of such a type is defined, and where the definition of a computable type refers to the notion of a computable term. Martin-Löf presumably considered this definition intuitionistically valid, but did not provide an explicit discussion of why this is so.
It is a non-trivial problem to give classical mathematical meaning to MartinLöf's computability predicates. One approach is due to Aczel [1] for the closely related construction of a Frege structure. Other approaches have been proposed by Allen [2] and by Löfwall and Sjödin [16] .
Although Martin-Löf's computability predicates nowadays can be regarded as an informal example of an inductive-recursive definition and therefore as a precursor of the concept of induction-recursion, its inductive-recursive nature is not explicit: instead of "computable type" Martin-Löf states when the notion of computability for a certain type "has been defined" and there is no explicit notion of proof for the fact that computability has been defined. In order to obtain an explicit inductiverecursive definition one has to formalize the metalanguage. It is an example of indexed induction-recursion [11, 13] , since we are defining computability predicates and thus by Curry-Howard indexed families of sets.
More examples of formal induction-recursion occur in recent work on large universes in type theory. These are constructive analogues of large cardinals in set theory. For example, Martin-Löf's universes are analogues of inaccessible cardinals; Palmgren's superuniverse [23] is an analogue of a hyperinaccessible cardinal. Rathjen, Griffor and Palmgren's quantifier universes [30] are analogues of Mahlo's π-numbers; Palmgren's higher order universes [25] go even further and are generally conjectured to reach the strength of Rathjen's theory KPM; in Section 6 we will describe a weak version of Setzer's Mahlo universe [36, 34, 35] , which is still inductive-recursive, and show that it has at least the strength of Rathjen's theory KPM [28] . Setzer's original Mahlo universe is an example of a universe which goes beyond induction-recursion.
Induction-recursion as a general unifying principle for definitions of this kind was identified by Dybjer [8, 11] , who presents an external schema for their syntactic form. This schema extends earlier schemata for inductive definitions in type theory [6, 7, 9, 26] . Dybjer and Setzer [12] give a finite axiomatization of inductionrecursion as a very general reflection principle. They also show the consistency of their axiomatization by building a model in classical set theory extended by a Mahlo cardinal. In this model function spaces are interpreted as full classical function spaces.
Models for inductive-recursive definitions of a set U with decoding function T are obtained as inductive definitions of the graph of T and captured formally as the least fixed point of a monotone operator on the lattice of subsets of a sufficiently large base set, see Dybjer [11] and the above-mentioned model by Dybjer and Setzer [12] . This should explain why it has not been natural to isolate the concept of induction-recursion in set theory. It also makes it difficult to trace the history of the concept.
In this paper we give a new compact finite axiomatization IR elim of inductiverecursive definitions based on the idea of modeling them as initial algebras in slice categories. Such a categorical model is an abstraction of the above-mentioned set theoretic semantics. It thus provides an alternative view of inductive-recursive definitions to the axiomatization IR refl given by Dybjer and Setzer [12] .
The two axiomatizations highlight different aspects of inductive-recursive defi-nitions. IR refl is based on the idea that induction-recursion is a reflection principle.
In the paradigmatic example operations on sets, such as Π and Σ, are reflected as operations Π and Σ on a particular set, the first universe U 0 . Induction-recursion generalizes this idea to operations on arbitrary types. Moreover, IR refl is based on a commuting square generalizing the usual initial algebra diagram used for modelling inductive definitions with the following correspondences:
inductively defined set initial algebra recursively defined function initial arrow IR elim on the other hand coincides with a natural understanding of inductionrecursion: elements of a set U are introduced by a constructor, and for every such element the value of the decoding function T is determined. Therefore it is closer to the standard set theoretic model. It also leads in a natural way to the functors on slice categories associated with the codes for inductive-recursive definition. (We show that the introduction/elimination rules in IR elim are equivalent to the principle that these functors have initial algebras.) The theory IR elim is shorter than IR refl ; it has fewer rules and concepts. Moreover, it is easier to construct codes for inductive-recursive definitions in IR elim . As a consequence it is more suitable as a basis for an implementation of induction-recursion. However, each of the formulations has conceptual advantages and is of importance for metamathematical investigations.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce the logical framework for intuitionistic type theory. In Section 3 we introduce IR elim . In Section 4 we introduce IR In Section 5 we recall the theory IR refl from Dybjer and Setzer [12] and show that it is equivalent to the two other theories under certain assumptions. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss Setzer's Mahlo universes which are type-theoretic analogues of Mahlo cardinals in set theory. There are two versions. One is an external Mahlo universe which is defined by induction-recursion and can be formalized in IR elim . We also determine a lower bound for its strength and therefore for IR elim , IR ext init and IR refl . The other version is Setzer's original internal Mahlo universe, which goes beyond induction-recursion.
A Logical Framework for Type Theory

Basic Rules
In the most recent versions, Martin-Löf type theory is presented in two stages:
• The first stage contains the most basic rules for dependent types. This is often referred to as the "logical framework" or "theory of types".
• The second stage contains the formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules for a number of set formers such as N n , N, +, Σ, . . .. This is sometimes referred to as the "theory of sets" and is about the basic notion of set in Martin-Löf type theory, that is, sets as inductively defined data types. It is important to distinguish between this notion of set and the notion of iterative set in the sense of set theory.
All sets introduced at the second stage can be defined by induction-recursion and the remaining sections of this paper provide a complete definition of this "theory of sets".
In this section we will define the "theory of types". This will contain the rules for such a theory in Nordström et al [22] , but also some new rules. We shall here give an informal introduction and refer the reader to Appendix A for the complete collection of rules.
The logical framework has four forms of judgement:
• A : type,
• A = B : type,
• a : A,
Each of these judgements can be hypothetical, that is, depend on a context Γ of the form x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , which specifies the types of the free variables x i of the judgement. The empty context (n = 0) is denoted by ∅.
For the treatment of contexts we need a fifth judgement
A hypothetical judgement is written Γ ⇒ A : type, etc. When presenting inference rules we shall often simplify rules by omitting uniformly appearing contexts (see Appendix A for details).
As usual, we have a type set, but we also add a new type stype of "small types". This contains all sets and is closed under 0, 1, 2, dependent product and dependent function space. (All these constructions are introduced below. Synonyms of "dependent product type" are "disjoint union of a family of types" and "Σ-type", and synonyms of "dependent function space" are "Cartesian products of a family of types" and "Π-type"). However set itself is not an element of stype. The reason for the need for stype is discussed in Section 3.2 and [11] . The rules for 0, 1, 2 are:
Both type and stype are closed under dependent function types written as (x : A) → B. Function abstraction is written as (x : A)a and application as a(b). They are related by both the β-and the η-rule. Further type and stype are closed under dependent products written as (x : A) × B. Pairs are written as a, b and the left and right projection of a is written as π 0 (a) and π 1 (a). Again, we have analogues of β and η (surjective pairing).
We also use some abbreviations. We omit the type in an abstraction, that is, write (x)a instead of (x : A)a. We sometimes write curried function types as (x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n ) → A instead of (x 1 : A 1 ) → . . . → (x n : A n ) → A, and omit variables which are not used. A → B := (A) → B. We write repeated application as a(b 1 , . . . , b n ) instead of a(b 1 ) · · · (b n ), and repeated abstraction as (x 1 , . . . , x n )a instead of (x 1 ) · · · (x n )a. Furthermore, if we apply an expression f (a 1 , . . . , a n ) introduced in this form by a rule to arguments b 1 , . . . , b k , we write f (a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b k ) instead of f (a 1 , . . . , a n )(b 1 , . . . , b k ).
We will in the following not mention equality versions of the rules. Moreover, we will omit types and premises in equality judgements and use "bracket notations" like E[t] as usual, see General Assumption A.0.3 in Appendix A for details.
We introduce furthermore the following notation for the definition of a function from one type into a product type from its two projections: Assume Assume the following: A : type;
Extensions of the Logical Framework
In the subsequent three sections we shall give three different formalizations of inductive-recursive definitions in type theory: IR elim (Section 3), IR ext init (Section 4) and IR refl (Section 5). We shall also prove the equivalence of these three theories extended by further rules and will therefore introduce additional theories.
Each of these theories consists of the rules of the logical framework together with some (yet to be specified) rules for inductive-recursive definitions. A rule r is here an n + 1-tuple Γ 1 ⇒ θ 1 , . . . , Γ n+1 ⇒ θ n+1 of dependent judgements in the language of type theory with respect to a certain collection of constructors (for a full formalization of the language of type theory see for instance Setzer [33] , chapter 2). If R is a collection of rules we introduce the type theory TT(R). We use the notation R ⊢ Γ ⇒ θ to make explicit that the judgement θ is derivable in the context Γ by using the rules of the logical framework (without extensionality) and by applying rules in R: If r is as above and R ⊢ Γ i ⇒ θ i (i = 1, . . . , n), then R ⊢ Γ n+1 ⇒ θ n+1 . We will as usual suppress R when writing down the judgements of type theory and often also keep the context Γ implicit.
Extensional Equality
Some of the rules of the theory IR ext init will only be typeable if we assume certain rules of extensional equality. These rules are similar to those of Martin-Löf's extensional type theory [18, 19] but are here formulated for the types and stypes of the logical framework. (Martin-Löf's extensional type theory was formulated without a logical framework.)
which is equivalent to f = (x:A)→B g, but has proof objects which can be used more directly.
We will also need to add the extensionality rules to IR elim and IR refl (yielding IR ext elim and IR ext refl ) in order to prove their equivalence to IR ext init . We want to emphasize that the rules for extensional equality are not needed when formulating IR elim and IR refl : the formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules are all typeable in intensional type theory, and it is therefore possible to consider them in that setting as well. However, our experience suggests that some constructions in intuitionistic metamathematics are difficult and perhaps even impossible to perform in intensional type theory, and that intensional type theory is sometimes counterintuitive -proofs which one informally believes are correct turn out to be incorrect when type checking them formally. It seems therefore that the extensional versions IR ext elim or IR ext refl are closer to our mathematical intuition and therefore more natural. On the other hand it is possible to construct nonnormalizing terms in extensional type theory so decidability of type-checking is lost. It is this property that is used crucially in the elegant implementations of proof assistants for intensional type theory.
The Category of Types
All three formalizations are based to a lesser or greater extent on category-theoretic ideas. However the definitions in the category theoretical part can be done only in the presence of extensional equality. We shall introduce for each collection of rules R, which contains the rules of extensionality, and each context Γ the category Type R (Γ). Its objects are A such that R ⊢ Γ ⇒ A : type and we identify objects A, B such that R ⊢ Γ ⇒ A = B : type. Arrows from A to B are functions f for which we can prove R ⊢ Γ ⇒ f : A → B (and again we identify f , g such that
We shall also usually suppress R and Γ in Type R (Γ) and simply write Type. It is only IR ext init which pursues the categorical approach fully. This theory is obtained by postulating, in the language of type theory, that for each type D and each code γ (for an inductive-recursive definition with decoding into D) there exists a certain endofunctor F γ on the slice category Type/D (more precisely Type IR ext init (Γ)/D) and that this endofunctor has an initial algebra. Here we recall that the objects of the slice category Type/D are pairs U, T such that U is an object and T : U → D in Type. Arrows from U, T to U ′ , T ′ are pairs f 0 , f 1 of reindexing functions functions f 0 : U → U ′ and proofs f 1 :
. f 1 is therefore a proof that a certain diagram commutes, a fact indicated as follows:
, such that f 0 and f ′ 0 are equal as arrows in Type/D (which implies by uniqueness of equality proofs that we can prove in R and under assumption Γ f 1 = f ′ 1 .) Both IR elim and IR refl also use categorical ideas to some extent, but in both cases the main guideline has been to formulate the rules in a way which is natural from a type-theoretic perspective and which recovers the usual rules of type theory without undue coding. So it will not be appropriate to investigate the categorical properties of Type IR elim and Type IR refl -in fact one needs to modify the definition of Type first in order to obtain categories at all, which then still lack many of the expected properties. However, in the presence of extensional equality and induction on the collection of strictly positive functors these theories will be equivalent to IR ext init .
A New Formalization of Induction-Recursion
In this section we shall give the formal rules of the theory IR elim . To motivate these rules we shall begin with some informal discussion. There are two issues:
• the correspondence between certain endofunctors on slice categories and the rules for inductive-recursive definitions;
• which endofunctors arise in this way.
Algebras in Slice Categories
Consider again the first universeà la Tarski U 0 with decoding T 0 : U 0 → set. This universe is closed under the formation of Σ-types, so there is a constructor
2 Note that we here use the uncurried version of the constructor, whereas the usual logical framework based version of type theory employs the curried version.
which is decoded as
Observe the occurrence of T 0 in the introduction rule for U 0 .
We can draw the defining equation for T 0 as a commuting diagram
Consider now the above under the additional assumption of extensionality in the slice category Type/set. We note that the above diagram expresses that we have an F 0 -algebra for a certain endofunctor F 0 on Type/set the object part of which has the following two components:
(To avoid confusion, note that U in italic font is a variable ranging over arbitrary sets, whereas U 0 (and later U) in Roman font are constant sets defined by inductionrecursion, and similarly for italic T and Roman T 0 and T.) When formalized in type theory, this F 0 -algebra becomes a quadruple U 0 , T 0 ,Σ, eq 0 (where eq 0 is a proof of the commutativity of the above mentioned diagram).
In IR elim we will also have a principle of universe-elimination for U 0 motivated by syntactic considerations. In IR ext init however, universe-elimination is replaced by the principle that U 0 , T 0 ,Σ, eq 0 is an initial F 0 -algebra. Furthermore we shall show in 4.4 that these principles are equivalent assuming rules of extensionality.
Inductive and Non-inductive Arguments
To get a complete formalization we must specify which endofunctors give rise to type-theoretically justifiable constructions. To motivate this specification we shall analyze the structure of a number of constructors (or introduction rules) for sets in type theory, and in particular emphasize the distinction between inductive and non-inductive arguments of a constructor (or premises of an introduction rule).
We shall first look at the case of inductive definitions, that is, the special case of inductive-recursive definitions where a recursively defined function does not participate in the inductive generation process.
The simplest inductive definition is that of a finite set N k with constructors 
The next example is the set Σ(A, B) with constructor p : (x : A, B(x)) → Σ(A, B): it has two arguments, where the index set B(x) of the second one depends on the first argument A. Again this can be parameterized by A : set and B : (x : A) → set. 
Σ(A,B)
In this diagram, the dotted arrows denote dependencies of later arguments of the constructor on previous arguments. The set N of natural numbers has constructors 0 : N and S : N → N. Here, the type of the argument of S is N itself. We call such an argument "inductive". 4 In contrast, all previous arguments are "non-inductive", since their types only refer to previously defined sets. 
N S 0
If we look at the set W(A, B) with constructor sup : (r : A, s : B(r) → W(A, B)) → W(A, B) we see that we have one non-inductive argument r and a family of inductive arguments s indexed by the set B(r): 
The primary example of proper induction-recursion is the definition of the universeà la Tarski. We note that U 0 is defined inductively, and while defining it, we simultaneously define recursively for every element a : U 0 a set T 0 (a) : set. Consider the constructorΣ : (a :
set.Σ has two inductive arguments, where the second depends on the first. This dependence is not direct (since U 0 is not defined yet), but indirect via T 0 , that is, using the recursion-hypothesis for T 0 . Finally, the definition of T 0 (Σ(a, b)) refers to the value of T 0 for all inductive arguments: 
In this diagram → represents the function mapping the constructed element to the recursively defined result. The dotted arrows express dependencies of later arguments of the constructor and of the recursively defined result of the constructor on previous arguments. We shall analyze the common structure of the examples above. First the arguments are classified as either inductive or non-inductive.
The type of a non-inductive argument is an stype. The typical case is that it is a set, for instance the two arguments of the constructor p for Σ(A, B) are elements of the sets A and B(a). In the case of Π(A, B) we have one constructor λ : (f : (x : A) → B) → Π(A, B) and the non-inductive argument f is indexed over the stype (x : A) → B. This type is not a set. In fact, this is why we cannot simply require that the type of a non-inductive argument is a set: we want to follow Martin-Löf and define Π-sets as inductively generated by λ.
An inductive argument is indexed by an stype. It can be a set, for example the second argument of W(A, B) is indexed by the set B(a), or it can be an stype, for example the argument of the successor in N is indexed by 1. Note that because of the η-rule for 1 there are bijections between 1 → A and A and an argument indexed over 1 is nothing but a single argument.
The type of later arguments may depend on earlier arguments. The dependency on a non-inductive argument is direct. However, a direct dependency on an inductive argument is not possible, because we cannot make use of the set we are currently defining. However an indirect dependency is possible, namely on the result of the recursively defined function T applied to the elements of the inductively defined set U indexed by the argument.
The result of T for an element introduced by a constructor depends on the arguments of the constructor in the same way as later arguments depend on previous ones.
If a set has several constructors it will be convenient to code them as one constructor with an extra argument indexed by a finite set which selects the chosen constructor. As we show below, the finite sets N k can be built up successively from 0, 1, and 2 by using inductive definitions.
The Type OP D of Operators on Families of D
We want to define a type OP D of codes γ for all inductive-recursive definitions of sets U γ : set, T γ : U γ → D. U γ will have one constructor, the arguments of which are elements of an stype which depends on U γ , T γ . Further the result of T γ for an element introduced by a constructor will depend on U γ , T γ and the arguments of that constructor. So we will associate with every γ a function
and U γ , T γ is the least set "closed under F γ ", i.e. such that every a :
The above definition cannot be simplified by defining by induction on γ directly the type of the arguments of the constructor of U γ : we cannot make use of the induction hypothesis relative to U γ ′ , T γ ′ .
So elements of OP D represent primarily functions from set-indexed to stypeindexed families of D. The inductive-recursively defined sets are obtained as the least set-indexed family of D which is "closed under this function". In the theory IR ext init , this picture becomes more clear: there OP D is a type of codes of endofunctors in the slice category Type/D and U γ , T γ together with the constructor and an equality proof form an initial algebra with respect to this functor.
In the following D will be a global parameter. Thus in the rest of the article we shorten our notations as follows:
General assumption 3.3.1 (a) We assume Γ ⇒ D : type (but will usually suppress Γ).
(b) We suppress a first premise D : type, which has to be added to each rule referring to D.
(c) We write, if some γ : OP D occurs as a parameter, γ instead of D, γ.
The formation rule for OP is
To each code γ we associate the two components of F γ above (note however that OP is an inductive definition, not an inductive-recursive definition on type level, and the inductive definition of OP D does not refer to • Addition of a non-inductive argument:
σ(A, γ) (where σ stands for the Σ-type) is a code for an inductive-recursive definition the constructor of which has one non-inductive argument a : A and depending on it other arguments given by γ(a). The result of T for an element introduced by a constructor with argument starting with a : A is the result obtained for the remaining arguments with respect to γ(a):
• Addition of an inductive argument:
δ(A, γ) (where δ stands for dependent Σ) is a code for an inductive-recursive definition the constructor of which has one inductive argument indexed over A and, if this argument is f : A → U , the other arguments determined by γ(T • f ). The result of T for an element introduced by a constructor with such an argument is the result of it for the remaining arguments with respect to γ(T • f ):
is an inductive-recursive definition with no arguments of the constructor and ψ as the result of T for an element introduced by it: 
Formation and Introduction Rules for U, T
The introduction rules for U γ and equality rules for T γ are
The formation/introduction rules for U, T are the rules above.
Elimination and Equality Rules for U, T
We are going to define elimination rules for U γ . Inductively defined sets like the set of natural numbers or the W-type are special cases of inductive-recursive definitions, so we obtain elimination rules for these sets as well as we do for universes (as introduced by Palmgren [24] ).
We have to collect the induction hypotheses with respect to an argument of intro γ , that is, with respect to an element u of F U γ (U γ , T γ ). The induction hypothesis consists of the value of the function to be defined for all references to U γ by inductive arguments in u, and will be an element of type F IH γ (U γ , T γ , E, u) with the following formation and equality rules:
Note that we allow E[x] to be an arbitrary type, that is, it does not need to be a set as in ordinary elimination rules. See [11] for a discussion of the need for such a large elimination schema in induction-recursion.
For the equality rules we need to define elements of F IH γ (U γ , T γ , E, u) from the values of recursively defined functions on the inductive arguments of u. This is the purpose of the operation
The elimination rule for U γ , T γ is the following:
The equality rule is
Note that these rules presuppose the formation and introduction rules for OP and for U, T. Definition 3.5.2 IR elim is the extension of the logical framework by the formation and introduction rules for OP and the formation, introduction, elimination, and equality rules for U, T. IR ext elim is the extension of IR elim by the rules of extensionality.
OP D -Codes for Some Standard Sets
Let us briefly review the examples of inductive and inductive-recursive definitions in Section 3.2 and assign codes in OP D to them.
In the first examples, we just have inductive definitions -there is no recursively defined T γ participating in the generation of U γ . In this case we introduce a dummy function T γ : U γ → 1 so that the code for the inductive definition is an element γ : OP 1 . We will only define the corresponding γ : OP 1 , the sets defined are then U γ . Let ι * := ι( * ) : OP 1 .
The empty stype 0 is part of our logical framework and we can code the set N 0 as γ N0 := σ(0, (x)ι * ) : OP 1 .
But it is possible to define N 0 without 0, since it can be defined as the set with only one constructor with type N 0 → N 0 . This definition has code
In Appendix B we prove that for the second definition of N 0 we can define ex falsum quodlibet.
The other finite sets have codes
A + B and Σ(A, B) have codes
With this definition the constructor of Σ has two arguments. An alternative is to have one argument having as type the dependent product of the logical framework:
N has code
Zero is here intro γN ( * 0 , * ), and the successor of n is intro γN ( * 1 , n, * ).
W(A, B) has code
Finally, the first universe (consisting of U 0 : set and T 0 : U 0 → set and for simplicity closed under N and Σ only) has code
Initial Algebras in Slice Categories
In this section we pursue the categorical point of view and introduce the theory IR ext init which expresses closure under initial F γ -algebras. The ext in IR ext init indicates that we here assume the rules of extensional equality.
We will also introduce the principle of OP-elimination and prove that this principle entails the equivalence of IR ext init and IR ext elim . This can be viewed as yet another theorem showing the correspondence between syntactic theories and categorical models, such as the correspondence between the typed lambda calculus and Cartesian closed categories, between (impredicative) intuitionistic type theory in the sense of Lambek and Scott [15] and toposes, etc. Note however, that we here only treat the categorical semantics of induction-recursion and not of the logical framework. The reader is referred to the literature on categorical semantics of dependent types for the latter, see for example Cartmell [4] , Seely [32] , Dybjer [10] or Hofmann [14] .
The categorical semantics of universes has previously been investigated by Mendler [21] . There he considers various universes which are all inductive-recursive definitions with D = set. Our approach goes further since we consider inductive-recursive definitions with arbitrary D and characterize the collection of endofunctors which have initial algebras.
Strictly Positive Endofunctors on Type/D
First we shall show how to define an endofunctor F γ in the category Type/D. For arguments U , T with U : set the object part of this functor coincides with F U γ and F T γ in IR elim . In order to obtain a functor in Type/D, we have to allow the argument U to be a type as well. So we have the new rules:
We shall now define the arrow part F → γ of the functor:
Note that in this type-theoretic formalization F → γ (f 0 , f 1 ) has two main arguments: the arrow f 0 and the proof f 1 that the triangle commutes. The rules are:
Note that in the last equality we use that T ′ • f 0 • g = T • g by f 1 and extensionality.
The commutativity of the right triangle in the diagram above is expressed by the following rule:
In extensional type theory the proof object of an equality type is irrelevant, since it is equal to ref. Therefore, when stating rules which generate elements of equality types, we will not introduce a new constant which generates a proof object, but instead write the conclusion of such a rule in the form of a judgement r = s : A, as in the rule above).
Further we have rules expressing the functor laws: 
can be proved by induction on γ and therefore be omitted in the formal theory.
The object part of the functors F γ refers to the argument U only strictly positively, but to T applied to these arguments both positively and negatively. This motivates part (b) of the following definition: Definition 4.1.3 (a) Let for γ : OP D be F γ the endofunctor on Type/D (with respect to rules R which contain the rules introduced in this section and those presupposed by it) with We can give the following names to strictly positive endofunctors on Type/D:
• F ι(ψ) is the "constant functor", the result of which does not depend on the arguments.
• F σ(A,γ) is the "disjoint union of functors": the first component of the object part is a disjoint union of the first components of the object parts of F γ(a) (a : A), and the other parts are defined accordingly.
• F δ(A,γ) is the "dependent disjoint union of functors": the first component of the object part is the disjoint union of the first components of the object parts of F γ(T •f ) for f : A → U , referring to the arguments of the functor, and the other parts are again defined accordingly.
The introduction rules for U γ and equality rules for T γ express that with
as expressed by the diagram
In the following we will define the rules expressing that U γ , T γ , intro γ , eq γ is an initial algebra and show that these rules are extensionally equivalent to the standard elimination and equality rules for U γ and T γ .
Rules for Initial Algebras in Slice Categories
We presuppose in this subsection the rules of extensionality, formation/introduction rules for OP and for U, T (which express that U γ , T γ , intro γ , eq γ is an F γ -algebra), and the rules for F → . Initiality of U γ , T γ , intro γ , eq γ means that for any other F γ -algebra U ′ , T ′ , f 0 , f 1 there is a unique mediating arrow h 0 , h 1 , such that the following diagram commutes:
The rules are (under additional assumption γ : OP D )
and, under the assumptions of the last rule,
init is the extension of the logical framework by the formation/introduction rules for OP and for U, T, the rules of extensionality, the rules for F → and the rules mentioned in this subsection.
Elimination Rules for OP
In Subsection 4.4 we will show that the elimination rules of U, T are equivalent to the rules for the same sets as an initial algebra. This will be shown by induction on γ : OP D and we need therefore to add elimination and equality rules for OP.
Definition 4.3.1
The elimination and equality rules for OP are the following: a, b, c) ) . We call these rules OP elim . They presuppose the formation/introduction rules for OP.
Equivalence of the Elimination Principle and the Existence of Initial Algebras
We shall show that the two theories IR This translation can be extended by additional symbols and rules.
Proof: We work in IR ext elim extended with OP-elimination and construct the family of functors F γ and initial algebras U γ , T γ , intro γ , eq γ for γ : OP D . First the extensions of F U γ and F T γ to U : type and F → γ can be defined by straightforward induction on γ such that the rules for F U , F T and F → hold. We are going to show that U γ , T γ , intro γ , eq γ is an initial F γ -algebra for γ : OP D . So let γ : OP D , U ′ , T ′ , f 0 , f 1 be another F γ -algebra, and construct a unique mediating arrow h = h 0 , h 1 , such that diagram ( * ) on page 17 commutes. To this end we shall use the elimination rule for U γ with
for u : U γ . To this end define locally by induction on γ ′ : OP D :
In the last equality we use that
′ by extensionality and the equality proof π 1 • g ′ . Moreover, we can show, by induction on γ ′ , that k γ ′ has the property that both triangles in the following diagram commute (h
ref has correct type since
Now we can define the two components of the mediating arrow by
To show the commutativity of the outer square in the initial algebra diagram we use the equality rule for R γ :
Finally, to prove uniqueness of h we assume that we have another mediating arrow h
Hence, by the induction principle it follows that h 0 (u) = U ′ h ′ 0 (u) for all u : U γ , and thus by extensionality h 0 = h by OP-elimination and verify their equality rules.
We define now R γ (the recursion operator for the inductive-recursive definition of U γ and T γ ) and verify the corresponding equality rule. So let E[u] be a type for u : U γ and assume
We will define
and verify that π 0 (h 0 (u)) = u, where h 0 , h 1 is the unique mediating morphism in the following initial F γ -algebra diagram:
OP D as follows (this is a local definition): We show π 0 • h 0 = fun Uγ →Uγ id and therefore R γ,E (g) :
The following diagram commutes
and all arrows are arrows in the slice category.
. Uniqueness of the arrows from an initial algebra implies now π 0 • h 0 = id, the assertion.
Finally, we show that the equality rules hold with the above interpretation:
where the third equality uses the commutativity of the following diagram (which can be proved by induction on γ ′ : OP D ):
Conclusion
We have seen that in extensional type theory together with the elimination rules for OP, the principle of U γ , T γ , intro γ , eq γ being an initial algebra is equivalent to the elimination/equality rules for U γ . In intensional type theory we cannot even express the principle of being an initial algebra, since the arrow part of the functors cannot be defined. However, because of the above mentioned equivalence, the principle of universe elimination can be described as a principle which can be formulated in intensional type theory and in the presence of extensionality expresses the initiality property.
5 Induction-recursion as a Reflection Principle
Background
When working in the slice category both U γ and T γ become part of the initial algebra and we break the pattern inductively defined set initial algebra recursively defined function initial arrow
The slice algebra approach is an abstraction of the set theoretic semantics of inductiverecursive definitions in terms of inductive definitions. It suggests the view that T γ (and not only U γ ) is inductively generated.
From a type-theoretic point of view, however, it is unnatural to view inductiverecursive definitions as special cases of inductive ones. We shall therefore recall an alternative formalization of induction-recursion which maintains the distinctions in the table above. This formalization was previously presented in Dybjer and Setzer [12] . It expresses induction-recursion as a reflection principle: for any type D and any D-operation d of "arity" φ, there is a set U Consider again the case of the constructorΣ for the first universe. We can express the fact thatΣ reflects (inside U ′ 0 ) the set-operation Σ by the following diagram:
We have simply observed that the diagonal arrow in the diagram in Section 3.1 factors through Σ. The general reflection principle is captured by the following commuting diagram:
Here . Note that this relationship with initial algebras is different from the initial algebra diagram in the slice category Type/D discussed in the previous section. There U γ , T γ arose as the carrier of an initial algebra and universe elimination arose as the initial arrow.
In this section we shall show the equivalence between the two formulations. To this end we briefly summarize the formalization in Dybjer and Setzer [12] and refer the reader to that paper for more details and discussion. 
An Alternative Formalization
We have the following introduction rules for SP:
We are now ready to give the formal rules for U ′ and T ′ . These rules have the common additional premises φ : SP D and d : Arg D,φ → D:
Formation rules:
Equality rule for T ′ :
Elimination rule:
Equality rule: a, b, c) ) .
The Correspondence between IR elim and IR refl
We are going to analyze the correspondence between IR elim and IR refl . See the diagram at the end of this section, p. 30 for a summary of the relationships.
First we show that, in the type theory containing rules of both theories, OP elim , SP elim and extensionality laws, there is a 1-1 correspondence between objects γ : OP D and pairs (φ : SP D , d : Arg D,φ → D) and that we obtain translations between the associated operations. Then we interpret the theory IR elim in IR refl and IR elim + OP elim in IR refl + SP elim (Theorem 5.3.3) , and in a last step interpret, using one additional rule, IR We start with translations between OP D and (φ :
Definition 5.3.1 We define in a type theory containing formation/introduction/elimination/equality rules for OP and SP
Theorem 5.3.2 Assume a type theory including formation/introduction/elimination/equality rules for OP and SP, rules for F U , F T , F IH , F mapIH , Arg, arg, map, IH, mapIH and extensional equality. Then, with variables chosen of appropriate type, the following holds (we omit in op, sp, d the parameter D):
The following diagram summarizes the correspondence (γ = op(φ, d)): The following list gives an interpretation of all terms in the language of IR elim , which are not in the language of IR refl (this interpretation has to be applied inductively to subterms as well)
, and with sp
Further, in part (b) we have, with
One easily verifies that with this interpretation the rules of IR elim and IR elim + OP elim hold in IR refl , IR refl + SP elim respectively. We are now going to study the interpretation of IR refl in IR elim . We will need additionally OP elim , extensionality and the following rules: • Using additionally an equality on 2, let for a : A + B isl(a) := (π 0 (a) = 2 * 0 ) : stype. 
such that we can prove
′ is a subtree of γ or equal to γ"), such that we can prove 
Proof of Lemma 5.3.7: (a) case OP D (γ) can be defined by induction on γ. In (b) we cannot simply use elimination rules on γ since for this we need a type to collect γ
for some a : A, and
The verification of the properties of D is now easy. 
),E (f ). All rules are then trivially fulfilled and we are done.
We will now interpret SP and verify the rules for it and work in the following in IR • for all subtrees of γ of the form ι(ψ) we have ψ = inl( * ), which corresponds to the fact that in SP D leaves do not refer to D,
• all subtrees of γ of the form δ(A, γ ′ ) are such that
which means that (since all proofs of (x : A) → isl(f (x)) are equal and force f to be equal to inl
However, there will be no direct relationship between the functors on slice categories coded by the corresponding elements in SP D and OP D+1 , we use OP D+1 only as a type of trees. So SP D is interpreted as • if γ ′ = ι(ψ), then ψ = inl( * );
ψ, A, γ ′′ , γ ′′′ can be expressed as terms in γ ′ by using case OP D , and therefore Cor D (γ) is built from universal quantifications, implication and conjunction only with the right side of all implications being an equality. By uniqueness of equality proofs follows therefore for all p, p
Further by transitivity of D+1 it follows
We now interpret
, q , and
Here p, q, r are suitable proofs of Cor D (γ ′ ) for the corresponding γ ′ : OP D+1 we obtain using in (ii), (iii) cor • φ. Further in (iii) f ′ : A → D is obtained from f and g such that inl • f ′ = f . By the uniqueness of elements of Cor D (γ) and the uniqueness of proofs of (x : A) → isl(f (x)) it follows: , φ) ) for some unique A, φ or -γ = op(ind(A, φ)) for some unique A, φ.
We can now interpret R SP and verify its rules in the following way. Assume γ 0 , E, a, b, c as in the premise of the elimination rule for SP D . We show for γ : OP D+1 ,
where g(γ) is defined using OP elim and p ′ is a proof of Cor D (γ ′ ) obtained from p and q.
Assume the assertion for immediate subtrees of γ, γ . It remains to verify that the equality rules for SP hold:
• R SP, * D,E (nil, a, b, c) = a is immediate.
•
• R In this final section we recall Setzer's definition of a Mahlo universe [36, 34, 35] in Martin-Löf type theory. In fact, we consider two versions of it, the original "internal" version, and another, to our knowledge yet unpublished "external" one, both of which have been the subject of much discussion during the last few years. There are several interesting connections between Mahlo notions and induction-recursion. First, the external Mahlo universe is a powerful example of what can be defined by induction-recursion in the current theory IR elim . Secondly, the internal Mahlo universe is a canonical example of a definition which goes beyond induction-recursion as formalized by IR elim . Whereas the external Mahlo universe, as all inductive-recursive definitions in IR elim , has constructors which are strictly positive in the set defined, this is not the case for the internal Mahlo universe.
The second author has determined a lower bound of the proof-theoretic strength of the internal Mahlo universe [36] and shown that its strength is substantially greater than the strength of the type theory known before (with W-type and finitely iterated universes). He will show in Subsection 6.4 how to modify this result to obtain a lower bound of the proof-theoretic strength of the external Mahlo universe, which is only slightly below the strength of the internal Mahlo universe. As a consequence we therefore get a lower bound of the proof-theoretic strength of the theory of inductive-recursive definitions IR elim and its variants IR ext init and IR refl . The goal of the definition of the Mahlo universe is to find a constructive analogue of a Mahlo cardinal and its recursive analogue, a recursively Mahlo ordinal. We briefly repeat the definitions. A cardinal κ is Mahlo (or more precisely weakly Mahlo) if it is regular and every normal function f : κ → κ has a regular fixed point.
The recursive analogue of a regular cardinal is an admissible, where an ordinal κ is admissible if it is > 0 and for every (set theoretic) Π 2 -formula ϕ with parameters in L κ which holds in L κ there exists an α < κ s.t. L α contains the parameters and ϕ holds in L α . An ordinal is recursively Mahlo if it is > 0 and for every Π 2 -formula ϕ (as before with parameters) which holds in L κ there exists an admissible π < κ s.t. ϕ holds in L π .
Related to the notion of a recursively Mahlo ordinal is the notion of recursively inaccessible: an ordinal is recursively inaccessible if it is admissible and the limit of admissibles. It can easily be seen that a recursively Mahlo ordinal is recursively inaccessible, and that the π mentioned above can always be chosen to be inaccessible. So an ordinal κ is recursively Mahlo, if it is recursively inaccessible and for every Π 2 -formula ϕ with parameters which holds in L κ there exists an inaccessible π < κ such that ϕ holds in L π , and we will take this characterization as a basis for the type-theoretic formulation.
In term models, W-sets correspond to inductive definitions which can be modeled by iterations of a certain operator up to an admissible κ such that the interpretations of the underlying sets are in L κ . A universe is inductively defined and closed under the W-formation and therefore modeled by iterating an operation up to a recursively inaccessible ordinal. Roughly speaking recursively inaccessible ordinals correspond to universes.
A universe V : set with decoding function S : V → set can be seen as the type theoretic analogue of a recursively inaccessible κ, and the type theoretic analogue of a Π 2 -formula, which holds in L κ , is a function f : Fam(V ) → Fam(V ). Here Fam(V ) := (a : V ) × (S(a) → V ) are V -indexed families of sets in V . The analogy of the fact that for any Π 2 -formula there exists a recursively inaccessible closed under it is now that for every function f as above there exists a universe U f closed under f .
So a formulation of the Mahlo principle in type theory is as follows: There exists a universe V which is a set with decoding function S such that for every function f : Fam(V) → Fam(V) there exists a subuniverse U f of V, closed under f and represented in V.
We can simplify this by currying f and splitting it into two functions f , g:
we take
The precise formalization of the Mahlo principle in type theory is now as follows: First of all V : set , S : V → set , and V, S is closed under the standard universe constructions. Assume now f, g as before. Then the Mahlo principle claims that we have a subuniverse U f g , T f g of V, S closed under f and g and represented in V. So we have U f g : set ,
and define for a : U f g T f g (a) := S( T f g (a)) : set . we claim the existence of codes in U f g , reflecting them, i.e.
Further U f g is closed under f and g, i.e. we have constructors
and U f g is represented in V, i.e.
U f g , T f g are inductive-recursively defined: They can be defined as
(". . ." stands for other universe constructions) where for V : set, S :
can be defined by an inductive-recursive definition. However, V itself has apart from the standard constructors, which are strictly positive in V, also one constructor, which is not at all positive in it, namely
Therefore V definitely goes beyond induction-recursion as discussed in this article. We call the above construction internal universe, since V is an element of set, in contrast to the construction in Section 6.3, where the Mahlo-universe is not an element of set, but set itself.
Simplification of U fg
In the above definition we demanded U f g to be closed under all standard universe construction. However these can be coded into suitable functions f , g typed as above.
Assume f, g as above. Define functions f ′ , g ′ of the same type by , b) ) .
and, if we call the i-th injection into this disjoint union i i , then
A non-empty sub-collection of sets of V, i.e. U : set, T : U → V, which is closed under f ′ , g ′ , but not necessarily under the standard universe constructions, has representatives for all universe constructions and for f , g relativized to it, so it is essentially a subuniverse closed under f , g. So we can omit the closure of U f g under universe constructions, except of one constant in order to obtain U f g nonempty, and still have a universe which is sufficiently closed. The canonical choice for the constant would be N. Alternatively one could add additional parameters a : V, b : S(a) → V to f, g and demand that U abf g contains additionally codes for a and b(x) (x : S(a)). Then closure under N is not needed. Note however that V has in any case to be closed under the standard universe constructions.
The External Mahlo Universe
The unproblematic part of the above definition was the definition of U f g . Now, instead of making this definition relative to V, we can make it relative to set as well:
Assume
Then we can define inductive-recursively a universe U f g , T f g closed under the standard universe constructions and under f, g. Again we can restrict the standard universe constructions to one, e.g. N, and have the following constructors of U f g :
We obtain the following code for U f g in OP set :
This is a nice example, which demonstrates how easy it is to verify that something is an inductive-recursive definition: one just has to find a code for it in OP D . Note that we got inductive-recursive definitions relative to parameters for free: assuming f , g as above we can derive elements of OP D and the corresponding sets and decoding functions, like U f g and T f g above, will depend on these parameters. We call the above construction, in which set plays the role of a Mahlo-universe (although set can be closed under other constructions as well), and which is subsumed by inductive-recursive definitions, the external Mahlo universe construction.
The Strength of the External Mahlo Universe
In [36] the second author showed that the strength of the internal Mahlo universe is at least as strong as the extension of Rathjen's Kripke-Platek set theory for recursively Mahloness, KPM [28] by ω admissibles above a recursively Mahlo ordinal, KPM
+ . [34] shows that this bound is sharp. The following theorem provides a lower bound for the strength of the external Mahlo universe. It is due to the second author.
Theorem 6.4.1 (Setzer) . Let T be the type theory having standard type constructions including the W-type, all with elimination rules into all types, and rules for the universes U f g , T f g as above for every f, g of the above mentioned type (but no elimination rules for U f g or other universes). The strength of T is at least that of KPM.
Roughly speaking, T as in the Theorem above can be called the type theory with the external Mahlo universe and full elimination rules Proof of Theorem 6.4.1. We will show how to adapt the well-ordering proofs [36] for the internal Mahlo universe to its external variant. In a future article, the second author will give an alternative proof. There he will extend ordinal systems to recursively Mahlo ordinals, and obtain simpler and more perspicuous well-ordering proofs.
Most definitions, lemmata, theorems and proofs in [36] can be carried over directly to the external Mahlo universe, if we replace V everywhere by set. Especially P(N) becomes the type N → set, and we can for A : P(N) define M(A), W(A) : P(N), Ag(A) : type. W can be defined as a class, i.e. we can define a predicate W(a) s. The only exception, where we can no longer carry over proofs from the internal Mahlo universe, is from the last part of Lemma 5.11 (b) onwards, because there we used W(W), which cannot be defined, since we are not allowed to define Wx : A.B for types A, B.
Instead we argue as follows. First we have transfinite induction over W, for if we have ∀x ∈ W.(∀y ≺ x.y ∈ W → ϕ(y)) → ϕ(x) , then, for every distinguished set A we have by A ⊑ W ∀x ∈ A.(∀y ≺ x.y ∈ A → ϕ(y)) → ϕ(x) , and by transfinite induction over A therefore ∀x ∈ A.ϕ(x). Since every element of W is in some distinguished set, it follows ∀x ∈ W.ϕ(x). Next we define W , Ω 1 ∈ W, Ω 1 , ω n (M + 1) ∈ C Ω1 (ω n (M + 1)), therefore by (+) ψ Ω1 (ω n (M + 1)) ∈ W ∩ Ω 1 ⊑ OT , and from transfinite induction over W follows transfinite induction up to ψ Ω1 (ω n (M + 1)) for n ∈ ω, which in the limit reaches ψ Ω1 (ǫ M+1 ). Rathjen determined the strength of KPM in [27, 28, 29] . The ordinal notation systems we used is based on [3] , where it is shown that the strength of KPM is at most ψ Ω1 (ǫ M+1 ) (which can be seen to be sharp as in [29] or by taking the above proof and adapting it to KPM). Therefore the assertion of the theorem follows.
A Complete Rules of the Logical Framework
In this article we omit in general additional contexts in rules. So for n ≥ 1 a rule We will usually omit the type in an equality judgement and assumptions about the types of the variables in it, it they can easily be filled in by the reader.
(c) We follow a common convention and write E[x] for an expression which may depend on a free variable x. After the first occurrence of it, E[t] denotes the result of substituting the term t for the variable x in E[x]. Further, after such an occurrence, E not followed by a square bracket stands for (x)E [x] . The latter will be used to denote parameters only.
B Derivation of Ex Falsum Quodlibet for N ′ 0
We verify that we can define ex falsum quodlibet for N 
